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WANTED DEAD & ALIVE:
MODERN LAW, UNIVERSALITY, AND THE COLONIAL
EXCEPTION
TAYYAB MAHMUD*
The exception is more interesting than the rule.... In
the exception the power of real life breaks through the
crust of a mechanism that has become torpid by
repetition.
-- Carl Schmitt
In the colonial principle of rationality, the native is thus
a thing that is, but only insofar as it is nothing.
-Achille Mbembe
Today... the need for colonization is as great as it ever
was in the nineteenth century .... What is needed then is
a new kind of imperialism, one acceptable to a world of
human rights and cosmopolitan values.
-Robert Cooper
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INTRODUCTION
Any serious discussion of questions of territorial sovereignty and
borders in modem international law unavoidably brings colonialism and
its aftermath into sharp relief. Is colonialism incidental to modem law in
both its domestic and international iterations? Or does it furnish the
essential grounds to frame modernity's landscape? Is there a no-man's
land beyond the reach of universality, the promise of constitutionalism,
and human rights? Does racial difference preclude the entry of the Other
into the zone of liberty, equality, and self-determination? Can modern
law outgrow its founding violence? These questions have haunted
modem constitutionalism ever since its inaugural moments. Both the
operations of modem power and related strategies of resistance are
animated by divergent answers to these stubborn questions. In various
guises, these questions furnish the sub-text of the law, the privileged site
of modernity. Every once in a while they percolate to the surface and
force the law to speak explicitly, to show its hand. And when the law
speaks to these questions, the speech is halting and fractured. In these
fractured texts one can trace the fissures of race and colonialism that
remain embedded in the edifice of modernity. Bancoult v Secretary of
State, a case decided by the High Court of Britain, is one such text.' This
is a case about the forcible removal in the 1970s of people of African
descent from Diego Garcia, a British colony in the Indian Ocean, to
make way for the largest US overseas military base.
My reading of Bancoult puts into question any linier
evolutionary reading of modem international law, constitutionalism, and
human rights. It also appears to refute any binary exclusion/inclusion
frame of constitutionalism and human rights to locate marginalized and
subordinated groups. Rather, Bancoult emerges as yet another instance of
modem law's long-standing practice to deploy--constitutionalism and
human rights notwithstanding-a three-step maneuver when confronted
with the racialized and colonized Other-engulfment, invocation of
exception, and subordination. In Bancoult, the court's decisions
regarding jurisdiction, standard of review, and substantive constitutional
and human rights in question appear to track this three-step stratagem
perfectly. Instead of any unfolding of the often posited
inclusion/exclusion binary, the racial and colonized other is found
incorporated in, indeed engulfed by, the constitutional order at large,
R (Bancoult) v Sec'y of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, [2001 ] Q.B. 1067.
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followed by invocation of the racial/colonial exception, which, in turn,
justifies withholding of full protections of the law.
I. COLONIALISM AND MODERN LAW
Modern law was forged on the anvil of the colonial encounter
between the West and the Rest. Colonialism sutured together
"territorialist and capitalist logics of power" on a world-wide scale.2 The
worldview forged and sustained by this encounter, and its accompanying
material and discursive structures, etched the foundational contours of
the very identities of the West and the Rest. These enduring contours
furnish the channels through which legal orders in and between these
entangled zones continue to flow.
The entanglement of colonialism and empire with modem law,
in both its national and international iterations, is quite transparent.3
While colonialism was "central and enduring in the making of modern
law," law remains "a key mode of imperial power." The savage and her
space, lacking Western understandings of geometry, history, and law,
had to be ordered to contain the danger of otherness. The colonized
Other, deemed an error of arrested evolution, was prescribed the
corrective culture of a higher rational order. Claiming the authority of
reason and redemption, colonialism undertook its "'soul making'
mission, ' combining with the "epistemic violence" of imperialism.' The
colonizers had no doubt that "[t]he Natives must either be kept down by
a sense of our power, or they must willingly submit from a conviction
that we are more wise, more just, more humane, and more anxious to
improve their condition than any other ruler they possibly could have."7
Colonial law substantiates that "violence is not exterior to the order of
droit. It threatens it from within" and necessitates that we "recognize
2 GIOVANNI ARRIGHI, THE LONG TWENTIETH CENTURY: MONEY, POWER, AND THE ORIGINS OF
OUR TIMES 54 (1994).
3 See PETER FITZPATRICK, THE MYTHOLOGY OF MODERN LAW (1992); PETER FITZPATRICK,
MODERNISM AND THE GROUNDS OF LAW (2001).
4 PETER FITZPATRICK, LAW AS RESISTANCE: MODERNISM, IMPERIALISM, LEGALISM 23 (2008).
5 Benita Perry, Problems in Current Theories of Colonial Discourse, in THE POST-COLONIAL
STUDIES READER 39 (Bill Ashcroft et al. eds., 1995) (quoting Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak).
6 Id. at 38. See also RACE AND THE ENLIGHTENMENT: A READER (Emmanuel Chukwudi Eze ed.,
1997).
7 Gauri Viswanathan, Currying Favor: The Politics of British Educational Policy in India 1813-
54, in DANGEROUS LIAISONS: GENDER, NATION AND POSTCOLONIAL PERSPECTIVES 113 (Anne
McClintock, Amir Mufti & Ella Shohat eds., 1997).
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meaning in a violence that is not an accident arriving from outside law.'"8
Modem law focused on the quality of the relationship between a people
and territory to articulate doctrines of "terra nullius" and "discovery"
and to fashion new property rights regimes.9 These, in turn, assigned
eligibility to autonomous political society and membership in global
society. Frames of jus gentium, or principles of law common to all
peoples, yielded to positivist ontology of law and sovereignty. Doctrines
of sovereignty and recognition, foundational building blocks of
international law, rest on such assignments."° The distinction between
"civilized" and "uncivilized"-constituted in no small measure by
modern geography-furnished the grounds for "civilizational
geopolitics," the dominant spatial imaginary of the West."
"[P]ositivism's triumphant suppression of the non-European world"'2
rested on the premise that "of uncivilized natives international law t[ook]
no account."'3
Consequently, in the modern global legal order, "[t]o
characterize any conduct whatever towards a barbarous people as a
violation of the laws of nations, only shows that he who so speaks has
never considered the subject."'4 This new and positivist international law
8 JACQUES DERRIDA, Force of Law: The "Mystical Foundation of Authority," in
DECONSTRUCTION AND THE POSSIBILITY OF JUSTICE 34 (Drucilla Cornell, Michel Rosenfeld &
David Carlson eds., 1992).
9 See JAMES ANAYA, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 198 (2d ed. 2004); Robert A.
Williams, The Algebra of Federal Indian Law: The Hard Trial of Decolonizing and
Americanizing the White Man's Indian Jurisprudence, 1986 WIS. L. REV. 219 (1986); PAUL 0.
KEAL, EUROPEAN CONQUEST AND THE RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES 51-52 (2003); BOYCE
RICHARDSON, PEOPLE OF TERRA NULLIUS: BETRAYAL AND REBIRTH IN ABORIGINAL CANADA
(1993).
'0 See ANTONY ANGHIE, IMPERIALISM, SOVEREIGNTY AND THE MAKING OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
(2004); Antony Anghie, Finding the Peripheries: Sovereignty and Colonialism in Nineteenth-
Century International Law, 40 HARV. INT'L L.J. 1 (1999); Antony Anghie, Francisco de Votoria
and the Colonial Origins of International Law, in LAWS OF THE POSTCOLONIAL 89 (E. Darian-
Smith & Peter Fitzpatrick eds.,1999); MARTI KOSKENNIEMI, THE GENTLE CIVILIZER OF
NATIONS: THE RISE& FALL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 98-178 (2001).
11 See JOHN AGNEW, GEOPOLITICS: RE-VISIONING WORLD POLITICS 88-89 (1998); GERRIT W.
GONG, THE STANDARD OF 'CIVILIZATION' IN INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY (1984).
12 Anghie, supra note 10, at 7.
13 John Westlake, John Westlake on the Title to Sovereignty, in IMPERIALISM 45, 47 (Philip D.
Curtin ed., 1971).
14 See JOHN STUART MILL, Dissertations and Discussions: Political, Philosophical and Historical,
Volume 111 168 (1867). Antony Anghie captures the relationship between international law's turn
to positivism and a particular characterization of colonized people well:
The violence of positivist language in relation to non-European peoples is hard to
overlook. Positivists developed an elaborate vocabulary for denigrating these people,
presenting them as suitable objects of conquest, and legitimizing the most extreme
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at the service of "the body of states ... consisting of persons interested in
maintaining the rules of good breeding"'5 produced a confluence of
people and territory in the category "backward" and legitimated colonial
acquisition of "backward territory."'6 Over time, the master narrative of
"civilization" created discourses of "development," "modernization," and
"globalization"-constructs that took on the work of classifying
populations, territories, and desirable social change.7 In succession,
attendant global legal regimes were put in place. Today these legal
regimes engulf the four corners of the globe in ubiquitous regulatory
designs that enforce elaborate normative orders over almost all realms of
collective life.
Inscription of the law over colonized bodies and spaces
subscribed to an enduring grammar of modernity's engagement with
alterity. This grammar is not one of exclusion.'" Rather, this engagement
violence against them, all in the furtherance of the civilizing mission-the discharge of
the white man's burden.
Anghie, supra note 10, at 7.
" JOHN WESTLAKE, COLLECTED PAPERS ON PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 6 (L. Oppenheim ed.,
1914).
16 M. F. LINDLEY, THE ACQUISITION AND GOVERNMENT OF BACKWARD TERRITORY IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW, BEING A TREATISE ON THE LAW AND PRACTICE RELATING TO COLONIAL
EXPANSION (1926); ROBERT A. WILLIAMS, JR., THE AMERICAN INDIAN IN WESTERN LEGAL
THOUGHT: THE DISCOURSES OF CONQUEST (1990).
17 Seeing societies through the binary lens of modem/traditional, this model prescribed diffusion of
modem technologies, laws, and ways of life as the panacea for underdevelopment. The resulting
economic policies, crafted under the watchful eyes of experts from the global North, focused on
growth of leading sectors of the economy, the trickle-down effect of which was supposed to, in
time, take care of lagging sectors and poverty. The capacity for effective control rather than
representative nature of the state was deemed the yardstick of an appropriate political order. See
W. W. ROSTOW, THE STAGES OF ECONOMIC GROWTH: A NON-COMMUNIST MANIFESTO (1960);
CHARLES KINDLEBERGER, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (3d. ed. 1977). For critiques of this model,
see SAMIR AMIN, UNEQUAL DEVELOPMENT (1976); SUSAN BODENHEIMER, THE IDEOLOGY OF
DEVELOPMENTALISM: THE AMERICAN PARADIGM FOR LATIN AMERICAN STUDIES 15 (1971);
ARTURO ESCOBAR, ENCOUNTERING DEVELOPMENT: THE MAKING AND UNMAKING OF THE
THIRD WORLD 10 (1995). This model of development was an extension of colonial designs of
social development. See VINAY GIDWANI, CAPITAL INTERRUPTED: AGRARIAN DEVELOPMENT
AND THE POLITICS OF WORK 14 (2008). It was in this context that the "law and development"
project emerged as part of the ensemble of prescribed legal designs far removed from the culture,
practices, and material needs of the vast populations of the global South. See JAMES GARDNER,
LEGAL IMPERIALISM: AMERICAN LAWYERS AND FOREIGN AID IN LATIN AMERICA (1980); Laura
Nader, Promise or Plunder? A Past and Future Look at Law and Development, 7:2 GLOBAL
JURIST 1 (2007), available at http://www.bepress.com/gj/vol7/iss2/artl; Issa G. Shivji, Law's
Empire and Empire's Lawlessness: Beyond Anglo-American Law, I J. L. SOC. JUST. & GLOBAL
DEV. (2003), available at
http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/law/elj/lgd/2003_l/shivji2/shivji2.rtf.
18 For a critique of the "exclusion" thesis in modem construction of race, see DENISE FERREIRA DA
SILVA, TOWARDS A GLOBAL IDEA OF RACE (2007).
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with alterity forms a three-pronged matrix:
engulfment/exception/subordination. The Other does not exist prior to
the engagement; it is not "discovered," left out or left alone--excluded
from operations of power. The Other was and is produced by and
through engagement. It is engulfed in operations of modernity, located in
zones of exception, and positioned in states of subordination. This
subordination in and as exception concurrently produces the Other and
the identity of the modem self.
The regimes of engulfment of the Other aim to render the
subjected body "more obedient as it becomes more useful."'9 Here the
role of law becomes critical. Recognition of the centrality of law to the
colonizing process stands widely acknowledged.0 Law in the colony
aimed to "reduce ... to civility" those who had "no skill of
submission."2 Violence was deemed a vital instrument of colonial
progress," with law furnishing "the cutting edge of colonialism."23
Violence in general, and the violence of law in particular, was seen as
playing "the leading part in the creation of civilization."24 Colonial rule
deemed "[o]ur law .. ' a compulsory gospel which admits of no dissent
and no disobedience."25 This overt concert of law and violence has been
aptly characterized as "lawfare, the effort to conquer and control
indigenous peoples by the coercive use of legal means."26 The geo-legal
space of colonialism brings into sharp relief "the blood that has dried on
the codes of law. 27
'9 MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON 137-38 (Alan Sheridan
trans., 2d ed. 1979).
21 See Sally Engle Merry, From Law and Colonialism to Law and Globalization, 28 LAW & SOC.
INQUIRY 269-90 (2003); NATHAN J. BROWN, THE RULE OF LAW IN THE ARAB WORLD: COURTS
IN EGYPT AND THE GULF (1997); CONTESTED STATES: LAW, HEGEMONY, AND RESISTANCE,
(Mindie Lazarus-Black & Susan Hirsch eds., 1994); RONEN SHAMIR, THE COLONIES OF LAW:
COLONIALISM, ZIONISM, AND LAW IN EARLY MANDATE PALESTINE (2000).
21 j. AXTELL, THE INVASION WITHIN: THE CONTEST OF CULTURES IN COLONIAL NORTH AMERICA
131,271 (1985).
22 ASHIS NANDY, THE INTIMATE ENEMY: LOSS AND RECOVERY OF SELF UNDER COLONIALISM 69
(1983).
23 MARTIN CHANOCK, LAW, CUSTOM, AND SOCIAL ORDER: THE COLONIAL EXPERIENCE IN
MALAWI AND ZAMBIA 4 (1998).
24 ERIC STOKES, THE ENGLISH UTILITARIANS AND INDIA 294 (1959).
25 R. C. J. COCKS, SIR HENRY MAINE: A STUDY IN VICTORIAN JURISPRUDENCE 87 (1988). See also
RADHIKA SINGHA, A DESPOTISM OF LAW: CRIME AND JUSTICE IN EARLY COLONIAL INDIA
(1998).
26 John L. Comaroff, Colonialism, Culture, and the Law: A Foreword, 26 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY
305, 306 (2001).
27 JAMES MILLER, THE PASSION OF MICHEL FOUCAULT 289 (1993) (quoting Michel Foucault).
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In the colony, law congealed epistemic, structural, and physical
violence. The colonized Other, deemed an error of arrested evolution,
was prescribed corrective norms of a higher rational order. This "soul-
making" colonial project entailed entrenchment of a layered legal order.8
First, the colony was inserted into the global legal system of
hierarchically differentiated sovereignties. Second, metropolitan law was
transplanted in the colony, supplemented by exceptions that ensured that
coercion displaced hegemony as its animating force,29 thereby ordering a
"rule of difference" that mandated performance of nonidentity between
the colonizer and the colonized.3" Third, through selective recognition,
malleable norms of the colonized were truncated and reconstituted as
fixed "customary law."'"
Attempts to modemize the colony while keeping its imagined
traditional lineaments in place produced a geo-legal space that, rather
than being a homogenous whole, was fractured-multiple normative
orders laid claim over the same space. This fracture complemented
"uneven development,"3 and the "'asymmetries' that inevitably arise out
of spatial exchange relation"33  orchestrated by global capital
accumulation. While the phenomenon of unevenness, and synchronicity
of the non-synchronous, is intrinsic to capitalism, this assumed an
exaggerated form in colonial contexts where diverse modes of
production were harnessed in the service of global accumulatioh.34 The
resulting concurrent homogenizations and differentiations continue to
animate the post-colonial imperial order.35 A close reading of Bancoult
substantiates these propositions.
28 PERRY, supra note 5, at 39.
29 See RANJIT GUHA, DOMINANCE WITHOUT HEGEMONY: HISTORY AND POWER IN COLONIAL
INDIA (1997).
30 PARTHA CHATrERJEE, THE NATION AND ITS FRAGMENTS: COLONIAL AND POSTCOLONIAL
HISTORIES 16-24 (1993).
31 See FRANCIS G. SNYDER, CAPITALISM AND LEGAL CHANGE: AN AFRICAN TRANSFORMATION
(1981); SALLY FALK MOORE, SOCIAL FACTS AND FABRICATIONS: "CUSTOMARY" LAW ON
KILIMANJARO, 1880-1980, (1986).
32 NEIL SMITH, UNEVEN DEVELOPMENT: NATURE, CAPITAL AND THE PRODUCTION OF SPACE 90
(1984).
33 DAVID HARVEY, THE NEW IMPERIALISM 31 (2003).
34 For the phenomenon of unevenness in political and economic registers, see generally SAMIR
AMIN, ACCUMULATION ON A WORLD SCALE: A CRITIQUE OF THE THEORY OF
UNDERDEVELOPMENT (Brian Pearce trans., 2d ed. 1974); HARVEY, supra note 33, at 87-136.
35 HARVEY, supra note 33, at 137-182.
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II. DIEGO GARCIA: MAKING A FOOTPRINT OF FREEDOM
Bancoult concerns Diego Garcia, a coral atoll in the Chagos
Archipelago situated in the southern Indian Ocean. It is a major
American military base from where in recent years B-52 flew ostensibly
to bring freedom, democracy, and the rule of law to Afghanistan and
Iraq. More importantly, the case concerns the Ilois,36 the native people of
the atoll, who were forcibly removed from the island in the 1970s to
facilitate the establishment of what the United States described as "an all
but indispensable platform" for the fulfillment of its defense and security
responsibilities in the region.37 "Discovered" by the Portuguese in the
early 16th century, it passed to the French in 1715.38 The French set up a
leper colony and copra production from coconut palms. The Ilois are the
descendants of slaves that were brought in from East Africa to work in
copra production.39 The Archipelago and Mauritius were ceded by France
to Britain in 1814 by virtue of the Treaty of Paris, following the
Napoleonic Wars. From that date until 1965 the archipelago was
governed as part of the British colony of Mauritius. Characterized as "a
beauty spot of unrivalled tranquility and beauty,"4 the islands were
governed by a British administrator based in the Seychelles who made
annual visits to the islands.4'
36 Ilois is Creole for "islanders," and has been in use since the 19th century to describe inhabitants
of the Chagos Islands. STEPHEN ALLEN, THE CHAGOS ISLANDERS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 2
n.5 (2014).
37 R (Bancoult) [2001] Q.B. at 1075 (describing a letter from the U.S. Dep't of State, dated June 21,
2000).
3' The history of Diego Garcia demonstrates the accuracy of Mbembe's observation that "from the
fifteenth century, there is no longer a 'distinctive historicity' of [colonized] societies, one not
embedded in times and rhythms heavily conditioned by European domination." ACHILLE
MBEMBE, ON THE POSTCOLONY, 9 (2001).
3' By the beginning of the 20th century, there was a population of about 426 families, of which 60%
were of African and Malagasy origin and 40% were Tamils from South India. JOHN MADELEY,
DIEGO GARCIA 4 (rev ed. 1985) (internal citations omitted). The Ilois brought to the islands were
like the black slaves on colonial sugar plantations about whom Montesquieu said, "It is
impossible for us to suppose these creatures to be men, because, allowing them to be men, a
suspicion would follow that we ourselves are not Christians." MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF
LAWS 316 (T. Nugent trans., J.V. Pritchard ed., 1952).
40 MADELEY, supra note 39, at 4.
I Id. at 12 n. 21. For a history and diplomacy surrounding the Chagos islands, see GUPTA RANJAN,
THE INDIAN OCEAN: A POLITICAL GEOGRAPHY (1979); D DIETER BRAUN, INDIAN OCEAN:
REGION OF CONFLICT OR 'PEACE ZONE' (Carol Geldart & Kathleen Llanwame trans., 1984);
ALVIN J. COTTRELL, SEA POWER AND STRATEGY IN THE INDIAN OCEAN (1981); K.S.
JAWATKAR, DIEGO GARCIA IN INTERNATIONAL DIPLOMACY (1983).
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In the early 1960s, the United States expressed to the British an
interest in establishing a permanent military base on Diego Garcia, one
free of local populations and of political control of post-colonial states.42
Initially, the United States was interested in the island of Aldabra, but a
military base there was deemed to endanger giant tortoises.43 In 1966, a
secret Anglo-American agreement signed "'under the cover of darkness'
without congressional approval or parliamentary oversight" allowed the
United States to build a military base on Diego Garcia.'
In 1964, through a secret "gentleman's agreement," in exchange
for 3 million pounds, the Chagos Islands were "excised" from Mauritius
to be retained by the British "for the construction of defense facilities by
the British and US governments."45 "The primary objective in acquiring
these islands," wrote a British Official, "is to ensure that Britain has full
title to and control over these islands ... so that Britain and the United
States should be able to clear the Territory of its current population."'46 In
1965, the archipelago was re-constituted as a separate colony, designated
the "British Indian Ocean Territory (BIOT)." This was done by virtue of
the British Indian Ocean Territory Order (SI 1965/1920), an Order in
Council made under the powers of royal prerogative, and "in exercise of
the powers in that behalf by the Colonial Boundaries Act 1895, or
42 "It would be unacceptable to both the British and the American defense authorities if facilities of
the kind proposed were in any way to be subject to the political control of ministers of a newly
emergent independent state." Simon Winchester, Diego Garcia, 73 GRANTA 207, 214 (2001)
(quoting a note by British Colonial Office minister, dated Oct. 20, 1964).
41 MADELEY, supra note 39, at 4 (quoting Robin Cook MP from "Britain's Other Islands," Granada
TV, "World in Action," June 21, 1982.).
44 DAVID VINE, ISLAND OF SHAME: THE SECRET HISTORY OF THE U.S. MILITARY BASE ON DIEGO
GARCIA 7 (2009); Availability of Certain Indian Ocean Islands for Defense Purposes, U.S.-U.K.,
Dec. 30, 1966, 18 U.S.T. 28. See also Naval Communications Facility on Diego Garcia, U.S.-
U.K., Oct. 24, 1972, 23 U.S.T. 3088. This agreement authorized only the construction of a
communications facility on the island. Id. This was superseded by another treaty in 1976, which
allowed substantial expansion of the facility. Naval Support Facility on Diego Garcia, U.S.-U.K.,
Feb. 25, 1976, 27 U.S.T. 316-17.
4 BORDERS AND TERRITORIAL DISPUTES 278 (John B. Allock et al. eds., 3rd ed. 1992). During
November of 1965, the British government negotiated a settlement with Mauritius about the
Chagos Archipelago. U.K. COLONIAL OFFICE, ANNUAL REPORT ON MAURITIUS (1965). This
settlement was reached at a constitutional conference convened to prepare the colony for
independence. ADELE SMITH SIMMONS, MODERN MAURITIUS: THE POLITICS OF
DECOLONIZATION 173 (1982). Representatives of Mauritius agreed to transfer the Archipelago to
the United Kingdom in return for three million pounds; the transaction was concluded orally and
there is no record of the sale negotiations and no exchange of documents. Id.
46 Winchester, supra note 42, at 214 (quoting a British official).
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otherwise in Her Majesty vested."'47 By virtue of agreement between
Britain and the United States, finalized in December 1966, BIOT would
remain under British sovereignty, but would be available for the security
needs of both states, and the United States secured a fifty-year lease to
the Diego Garcia.48 In 1968, Mauritius was decolonized. In 1971, the
commissioner of BIOT issued a measure designated the Immigration
Ordinance, purportedly made under powers conferred by section 11 of
the BIOT Order; the section provides that "[t]he Commissioner may
make laws for the peace, order and good government of the Territory.' '" 9
The Order made it unlawful for anyone to remain in the Territory without
a permit; and authorized the commissioner to remove indefinitely people
remaining in the Territory unlawfully; and persons awaiting removal
could be kept in custody. Between 1971 and 1973 all native inhabitants
of the islands were removed and "dumped dockside of Port Louis in
Mauritius.""0 For good measure, nearly a thousand dogs, strays and ones
the natives were forced to abandon at the their removal, were burned to
47 R (Bancoult) v. Sec'y of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, [2001] Q.B. 1067 at
1076 (Eng.) (quoting the BlOT Order, 1965, S.I. 1965/1920).
48 18 U.S.T. 28, supra note 44, at 31. To keep transaction from the parliament and the public,
Britain successfully persuaded the Americans to disguise the $14 million lease fee as a discount
on research and development charges for Polaris nuclear missiles being sold to the Royal Navy.
Winchester, supra note 42, at 222.
49 Bancoult, [2001] Q.B. at 1077.
50 Winchester, supra note 42, at 217-18. In Mauritius, an island with high unemployment and no
scheme in place for resettlement and integration, the Ilois remain marginalized and destitute.
Following a public campaign about their plight by the Mauritian Militant Movement, in 1973
Britain agreed to pay 650,000 pounds to the Mauritian government for relief and resettlement,
which was described by Britain as "full and final" discharge of its obligations. MADELEY, supra
note 39, at 5. In the late 1970s, Mauritian government asked for increased compensation. Britain
offered 1.25 million pounds, but insisted that compensation would be paid only to those Ilois
who would sign a no return clause. Id. at 15 The clause reads: "I am an Ilois who left that part of
British Indian Ocean Territory known as ... never to return. We accept the money already paid
to the Mauritian Government ... and abandon all our claims and rights (if any) of whatsoever
nature to return to the British Indian Ocean Territory." Id. (quoting Deed of Acceptance & Power
of Attorney). Some Ilois signed, but most refused. In 1982, Britain gave 4 million pounds to be
administered by a trust. All claims to this trust lay dormant until the Bancoult case in 1999.
Rachael Bradley, Diego Garcia-Britain in the Dock, 7 BOUNDARY AND SEC. BULL. 82, 87
(1999). In the early 1980s, a new government of Mauritius announced that it intended to present
its claim over the archipelago to the International Court of Justice. Joseph Lelyveld, Election in
Mauritius Sharpens Diego Garcia Issue, N.Y. TIMES, June 20, 1982, at 16. The Mauritian claim
is summarized in G.A. Res. 38/711, U.N. Doe. A/38/711 (Dec. 8, 1983). The British claim is
summarized in G.A. Res. 38/598, U.N. Doc. A/38/598 (Nov. 22, 1983). Due to political changes
within Mauritius, the case was never pursued. For a legalistic examination of Mauritius' claim,
see generally Timothy P. Lynch, Diego Garcia: Competing Claims to a Strategic Island, 16
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 101 (1984).
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death in a coconut calorifier" Construction of the military base on Diego
Garcia began in 1971; the facility became fully operational in 1973, and
was expanded in the 1980s. Today it serves as a major naval and air
force base and as a staging area for ground troops. Diego Garcia was
used to launch long-range cruise missiles and B-52 bombers during the
1991 Gulf War, the 1998 bombing of Iraq, the American operation
against Afghanistan in 2001, and the 2003 invasion of Iraq." Since 2001,
Diego Garcia has also been claimed to be a holding center for people
captured in the "war against terrorism."53 On the water tower by the
entrance to the military base are painted the words: "DIEGO GARCIA:
THE FOOTPRINT OF FREEDOM."
The American demand that the islands be "fully sanitized" and
"swept,"54 of native inhabitants, on the one hand, and mandates of Article
73 of the UN Charter 5 and General Assembly Resolution No 1514 of
December 14, 1960,56 on the other, presented the British government
with "an awkward problem."57 Britain knew well that "the territory is a
non-self-governing territory and there is a civilian population even
though it is small."58 To cope with this dilemma, Britain adopted a two-
pronged strategy. One prong comprised of "a policy of 'quiet
disregard'-in other words, let's forget about this one until the United
51 Winchester, supra note 42, at 209-10.
52 Osei Boateng, Diego Garcia: Africa's Forgotten Island, NEW AFRICAN, Sept. 2002, at 26; John
Pilger, A Little-Known and Suppressed British Atrocity in a Faraway Island Tells us Much about
the Function of "Globalisation ", NEW STATESMAN, Sept. 27, 1996, at 34; John Pilger, A War in
the American Tradition, NEW STATESMAN, Oct. 15, 2001, at 12.
53 VINE, supra note 44, at 9; David Vine & Laura Jeffery, "Give Us Back Diego Garcia": Unity
and Division among Activists in the Indian Ocean, in THE BASES OF EMPIRE: THE GLOBAL
STRUGGLE AGAINST U.S. MILITARY POSTS, 181 (Catherine Lutz ed., 2009); Philip Shenon,
Mideast Turmoil: Intelligence; Officials Say Qaeda Suspect Has Given Useful Information, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 26, 2002, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2002/04/26/world/mideast-turmoil-
intelligence-officials-say-qaeda-suspect-has-given-useful.html.
54 Winchester, supra note 42, at 214.
55 The article requires members "to transmit regularly to the Secretary General ... statistical and
other information of a technical nature relating to economic, social and educational conditions in
the territories for which they are respectively responsible." U.N. Charter art. 73, para. e.
56 The Resolution reads: "Any attempt aimed at the partial or total disruption of the national unity
and the territorial integrity of a country is incompatible with the purposes and principles of the
Charter of the United Nations." G.A. Res. 1514 (XV), U.N. GAOR, 15th Sess., U.N. Doc.
A/L.323 and Add. 1-6, at 67 (Dec. 14, 1960).
57 See R (Bancoult) v. Sec'y of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, [2001] Q.B. 1067 at
1081 (quoting a British governmental note, (Nov. 12, 1965)).
58 id.
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Nations challenges us on it."59 The other prong would "avoid any
reference to 'permanent inhabitants"'60 and directed that "[i]t is . . . of
particular importance that the decision taken by the Colonial Office
should be that there are no permanent inhabitants in the BIOT."' Only
through these strategies, "Britain or the United States should be able to
clear it (BIOT) of its current population. The Americans in particular
attached great importance to this freedom of maneuver, divorced from
the normal considerations applying to a populated dependent territory." '62
The enunciated official position therefore had to be that "[t]he islands...
had, for all practical purposes, no permanent population."63 Furthermore,
Britain, "could not accept the principles governing our otherwise
universal behaviour in our dependent territories, e.g., we could not
accept that the interests of the inhabitants were paramount and that we
should develop self-government there."'64 The Foreign Office legal
advisor gave his imprimatur to the strategy: "In this respect we are able
59 Id. This followed the adoption of a resolution of the United Nations General Assembly
condemning the transfer of the Archipelago from Mauritius, and declared the occurrence as a
violation of the territorial integrity of Mauritius. G.A. Res. 2066 (XX), U.N. GAOR, 20th Sess.,
Supp. No. 14, U.N. Doc. A/6160, at 57 (Dec. 16, 1965). The resolution was adopted on the
advice of the Special Committee appointed to implement the Declaration on the Granting of
Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. G.A. Res. 1654 (XVI), U.N. GAOR, 21st
Sess., Supp. No. 17, U.N. Doc. A/L 336 and Add. 1-3, at 65 (Nov. 27, 1961). General
Assembly's disapproval was repeated in 1966 and 1967. G.A. Res. 2232 (XXI), U.N. GAOR,
21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6628, at 75 (Dec. 20, 1966). G.A. Res. 2357, U.N.
GAOR, 22nd Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc A/7013, at 56 (Dec. 19, 1967). The Special
Committee's final report on Mauritius reiterated disapproval of the transaction. Rep. of the
Special Comm. on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Dec. on the Granting of
Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, U.N. Doc. A/7200fRev. 1, Ch. XI; GAOR, 23rd
Sess. (Nov. 18, 1968). The Special Committee continued to consider the question of the BIOT
with regards to the Seychelles Islands until 1972; each year from 1968 to 1972, the General
Assembly, on advice of the Special Committee, adopted a resolution deploring the severance of
the territory and the construction of military bases in the Indian Ocean. The United Kingdom
abstained from voting on any of these resolutions. G.A. Res. 2984 (XXVII), U.N. GAOR, 27th
Sess., Supp. No. 30, U.N. Doc. A/8955, at 85 (Dec. 14, 1972); G.A. Res. 2869 (XXVI), U.N.
GAOR, 26th Sess., Supp. No. 29, U.N. Doc. A/8616, at 104 (Dec. 20, 1971); G.A. Res. 2709
(XXV), U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, U.N. Doc. A/8248, at 100 (Dec. 14, 1970); G.A.
Res. 2592, U.N. GAOR, 24th Sess., Supp. No. 30, U.N. Doc. A/7896, at 74 (Dec. 16, 1969);
G.A. Res. 2430, U.N. GAOR, 23rd Sess., Supp. No. 18, U.N. Doc. A/7419, at 64 (Dec. 18,
1968). In 1976 Seychelles gained independence and the islands of Aldabra, Desroches and
Farquhar, that had been made part of BLOT, were ceded to Seychelles. Boateng, supra note 52, at
28.
6 Bancoult, [2001] Q.B. at 1082 (quoting a confidential missive from the Secretary of State for the
Colonies to the Commissioner of BlOT, dated Feb. 25, 1966).
61 Id. at 1082-83 (quoting a minute about the position of the Colonial Office (June 1966)).
62 Id. at 1083 (quoting a British government document (Aug. 12, 1966)).
63 Id. (emphasis added).
6 Id. at 1084 (emphasis added).
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to make up the rules as we go along and treat the inhabitants of BIOT as
not 'belonging' to it in any sense."65 The Court in Bancoult found "the
flavor of these documents a little odd. It is as if some of the officials felt
that if they willed it hard enough, they might bring about the desired
result, and there would be no such permanent population."66 The Court
found some of the material documents contained in governmental files
"embarrassing and worse."67
The Foreign Office legal advisor was clear that the purpose of
the BIOT Immigration Ordinance was "to maintain the fiction that the
inhabitants of Chagos are not a permanent or semi-permanent
population.... [T]he British Government will have to continue to argue
that the local people are only a floating population."68 That the alchemy
of turning native population into non-inhabitants might involve
stretching the truth was of little concern. Rather, there was irritation to "a
certain old fashioned reluctance to tell a whopping fib, or even a little
fib, depending on the number of permanent inhabitants."69 The marching
orders were:
[w]e must surely be very tough about this. The object of the exercise
was to get some rocks which will remain ours; there will be no
indigenous population except seagulls who have not yet got a
committee (the Status of Women Committee does not cover the rights
of birds).70
The reference to the Status of Women Committee may have been
prompted by the fact that the Ilois constituted a "pronounced matriarchal
65 Id. at 1085 (quoting a minute by the Foreign Office legal adviser (Oct. 23, 1968)) (emphasis
added).
66 Id. at 1081. The posture of British authorities reminds one that:
To colonize is also to deploy a subjectivity freed of any limit, a subjectivity seeing
itself as absolute but which, to experience that absolute, must constantly reveal to
itself by creating, destroying, and desiring the thing and the animal that it has
previously summoned into existence. From the standpoint of the conqueror, the
colony is a world of limitless subjectivity. In this, the act of colonizing resembles a
miracle.
MBEMBE, supra note 38, at 189.
67 Bancoult, [2001] Q.B. at 1106.
68 Id. at 1086 (quoting the advice of the Foreign Office legal advisor, (Jan. 16, 1970).
69 Id. at 1083 (quoting a manuscript note by a British official).
70 Id. (quoting a minute from the Permanent Under Secretary of the Colonial Office (Aug. 24,
1966)). Another official added the comment: "Unfortunately along with the birds go some few
Tarzans or Men Fridays whose origins are obscure, and who are being hopefully wished on to
Mauritius etc. When this has been done I agree we must be very tough and a submission is being
done accordingly." Id.
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society," where women outnumbered men in the total population, and
women were dominant in the struggle against the mass removal and
exile.7'
The legal alchemists turned to private law constructs of property
rights and contracts to turn natives into non-inhabitants. As a matter of
private law, title to the Chagos Islands had vested in the plantation
company, Chagos Agalega Ltd., and the British government purchased
the company's rights in 1967. The islands were then managed by the
same company under lease from the government. Later the company was
reconstituted and renamed Moulinie & Co Ltd. and continued to manage
the islands under contract with the Crown. Both before and after the
acquisition of the company by the Crown, all inhabitants of the islands,
including the native Ilois, were contract workers on the copra plantations,
or family members of such workers. None of the natives enjoyed
property rights in any of the land. The British authorities sought to rely
on the native inhabitants' lack of such property rights, and their status as
contract workers wholly dependent on the plantations, as being
inconsistent with their possession of any public law rights to remain in
the territory as citizens of it. Besides the lack of any right to remain, the
status of the natives with regards to private law regimes of property and
contract was supposed to absolve the British government of any
responsibility towards the United Nations." The acquisition of the copra
company's rights was motivated by a desire to cement this status. Before
the acquisition, the Secretary of State for the Colonies informed the
Commissioner of BIOT:
[w]e are... taking steps to acquire ownership of the land on the
islands and consider that it would be desirable ... for the inhabitants
to be given some form of temporary residence permit. We could then
more effectively take the line in discussion that these people are
Mauritians and Seychellois; that they are temporary residents in
BIOT for the purpose of making a living on the basis of contract or
day to day employment with companies engaged in exploiting the
islands; and that when the new use of the islands makes it impossible
for these operations to continue on the old scale the people concerned
will be resettled in Mauritius or Seychelles.
73
71 MADELEY, supra note 39, at 4; Id. at 3-4 (noting that the gender balance of the population was
rooted in the Chagos Islands having had been a leper colony).
72 Bancoult, [2001] Q.B. at 1081 (quoting a Foreign Office memorandum (July 28, 1965)).
71 1d. at 1082 (quoting a confidential missive (Feb. 25, 1966)).
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The issue was turned from historic presence to one about
"belonging," and policy rationale became that "although they have been
in Chagos for a long time, they have lived there only on sufferance of the
owners of the islands, and could at any time have been sent back to
Mauritius if no longer wanted in connection with the estate. They have
never in the past had any right to reside permanently in Chagos."74 In
arguments before the Court, the British government sought to capitalize
on the fact that "[t]he Ilois accepted that they could be moved by their
employers from one island to another and even from the islands as a
whole if, for example, they were guilty of misconduct."75
Internal correspondence of the British government indicates an
awareness of problems with grounding public law rights upon private
law status. Some officials remained skeptical "about the validity of the
argument that the Ilois have lived in Chagos 'only on sufferance of the
owners,' since the point at issue is 'belonging' in the national sense
rather than rights of residence on private property."76 Others pointed out
that "all the inhabitants of BIOT (totaling under 1500) are citizens of the
UK and Colonies and they are all entitled to a UK passport with the
colonial endorsement .... If they applied for a UK passport, presently the
colonial endorsement could only reveal that they belong to BIOT since
there was no other British colony to which they could belong."77
Decision-makers, however, continued to ground the expulsion policy on
the premise that, "[t]he people with whom we are concerned are working
in the Chagos under contract and own no property or fixed assets
there."" Lack of such rights were grounds "to continue to argue that the
local people are only a floating population.., strict immigration
legislation giving such laborers and their families very restricted rights of
residence would bolster our argument that the territory has no indigenous
or settled population."79 And given "the earnest desire of the British
Government to ensure that its [Ordinance] making should be attended by
as little publicity as possible... . The ordinance would be published in
71 Id. at 1084 (quoting the Commissioner for BIOT to the Secretary of State in minutes
accompanying draft Ordinance (Mar. 2, 1967)).
75 Id. at 1079 (quoting an argument by the British government's counsel).
76 Id. at 1084 (quoting a missive to the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Affairs (Sept. 29,
1967)).
77 Id. at 1084-85 (quoting an intra-governmental note, (Sept. 4, 1968)).
78 Id. at 1085 (quoting minute from Foreign Secretary to the Prime Minister (Apr. 29, 1969)).
79 Id. at 1086 (quoting Advice by the Foreign Office legal adviser (Jan. 16, 1970)).
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the BIOT Gazette, which has only very limited circulation both here and
overseas .... Publicity will therefore be minimal."8
The Court rehearsed these facts partly in response to the
plaintiff's position that the Ordinance and the actions taken under it were
things done for an improper motive or purpose, i.e., not only to facilitate
the establishment of the military base, but also to keep the whole affair a
secret. The Court recounted the facts to fulfill its obligation "to
demonstrate that it has at least a reasonable understanding of the issues
which exercised the decision makers of the time, and how they
responded to them," And hastened to add that "although, of course,
nothing is more elementary than that we are not policy makers ourselves
and must decide the case by reference only to the applicable law."' The
Court held that the plaintiff was not entitled to succeed on this ground so
far as it is put forward as a freestanding head of challenge. According to
the Court, it all depended on the scope of the enabling legislation, the
BIOT Order; if the scope was indeed as wide as the government
contended, then "what was done would have been justified in law; in
particular, the dictates of the desired military base would have fallen
within (the scope of the Order). The desire for secrecy would have been
ancillary, not separately objectionable."82 The deference of the Court to
governmental policy included its position that "[t]here is no doubt but
that the defense facility which the base provides is of the highest
importance."83
III. JURISDICTION: ENGULFMENT NOT EXCLUSION
As a first step towards deciding the case, the Court considered
the question of jurisdiction. It held that the Divisional Bench of the
Queen's Bench in London did have jurisdiction. The Government had
argued for lack of jurisdiction on two grounds. One, that any petition
against the Ordinance should be laid before the BlOT Courts, from
where the ultimate court of appeal is the Judicial Committee of the Privy
Council. From the Queen's Bench the ultimate court of appeal is the
House of Lords. Thus there exists the possibility of conflicting judicial
80 Id.
I Id. at 1079.
2 Id. at 1105.
8 Id. at 1075. For the Court this was established by a June 21, 2000 letter by the US State
Department that described the base as .'an all but indispensable platform' for the fulfillment of
defense and security responsibilities [in the region]." Id.
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opinions at the highest level. On this ground, the government argued that
the Court as a matter of discretion, rather than jurisdiction, should not
adjudicate. Two, the government argued the doctrine of divisibility of the
Crown, i.e., that the Crown should be treated as a separate sovereign
entity vis-d-vis each territory over which it has sovereignty.4
As for the first argument, the Court indicated that "the possibility
is altogether more apparent than real," apparently mindful of the fact that
there was no court structure in place in BIOT, despite provision for one
in the BIOT Order." Furthermore, the petitioner was not permitted to
enter the BIOT, the very grounds of the case, and hence not able to avail
of any relief that may had been available from the courts of BIOT. As for
the divisibility of the Crown argument, the Court found it to be "an
abject surrender of substance to form." 6 The Court recounted that the
Ordinance was done on orders of the ministers in London; that the
"government had entered into obligations and understandings with the
Americans, not with the government of BOT. The government of BIOT
was itself a creature of those understandings."87 Furthermore, the BIOT
courts could rightly take the position that they had no control over
officials sitting in London. The Court rested its holding of jurisdiction on
Lord Mansfield's dictum in R v Cowle,8 s that prerogative writs "may
issue to every dominion of the Crown of England. There is no doubt as to
the power of this court; where the place in under the subjection of the
Crown of England; the only question is, as to propriety."89 Lord
Denning's holding that "[i]f the Crown exceeds its jurisdiction over the
Sld. at 1086 (citing R v. Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, ex p Indian
Association of Alberta (1982) QB 892; Tito v. Waddell (No 2) (1977) Ch 106. 255A-B; R v.
Secretary of State for the Home Department, Ex p Bhurosah (1968) ! QB 266 ('In Mauritius the
Queen is the Queen of Mauritius.' Per Lord Denning MR at p. 284E).
85 Id. at 1077 (citing Sections 16 and 17 of the BlOT Order). A Supreme Court for BIOT was
established by the Courts Ordinance 1983 (BLOT Ordinance No 3 of 1983), which provided for
this court: "unlimited jurisdiction to hear and determine any civil or criminal proceedings under
any law and with all the powers, privileges and authority which is vested in or capable of being
exercised by the High Court of Justice in England." Id. Transcript of Judgment at 3-4, R v. Sec'y
of State for the Home Dep't, Exparte Bancoult, [1999] Q.B. (CO/3775/98).
86 Bancoult, [2001] Q.B. at 1092.
87 Id. The court could have pointed out the fact that the government and legislature of BlOT is a
team of four civil servants in the Foreign and commonwealth Office in London who work part-
time for the BlOT administration, and whose costs are borne not by BlOT but the British
government. 361 PARL. DEB., H.C. (6th ser.) (2001)404WA (U.K.).
88 R v. Cowle, [1759] Eng. Rep. 834 at 855.
89 Bancoult, [2001] Q.B. at 1087 (quoting R v. Cowle, (1759), Eng. Rep. 834 at 855).
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colony, its conduct can be challenged in these courts," was also cited in
support. 90
IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW: INVOCATION OF THE COLONIAL
EXCEPTION
The petitioner had asked the Court to apply the so-called Witham
principle, enunciated by Lord Justice Laws as the standard of review of
executive actions that implicate fundamental constitutional rights.9 In
Witham, the Court had struck down the relevant part of a measure that
restricted access to courts by those reliant upon legal aid. The Court held
that a fundamental or constitutional right could be abridged by the
executive only where that was specifically authorized by express words
in the enabling Act of Parliament.92 The government, on the other hand,
contended that the appropriate standard of review in Bancoult was
furnished by the Colonial Laws Validity Act 1865 and the Privy
Council's pronouncement in Liyanage v. The Queen.93 The Colonial
Laws Validity Act provides that no colonial law shall be deemed to be
void and inoperable on grounds of repugnancy to the law of England,
unless it is repugnant to some act of parliament made applicable to such
90 Id. (quoting Sabally and N'Jie v Attorney General, (1965) Q.B. 273 at 290 (Eng.)). The Court
noted that while the 1861 case In re Mansergh, (1861) 121 Eng. Rep. 764, had put in doubt the
breadth of Lord Mansfield's dictum, two 20th century cases gave further support to it. Bancoult,
[2001] Q.B. at 1089 (also citing Ex parte Mwenya, (1960) 1 Q.B. 241 and R v. Earl of Crewe, Ex
pare Sekgome, (1910) 2 K.B. 576). In Mansergh, Lord Evershed had cited Blackstone ("'for the
King is at all times entitled to have an account why the liberty of any of his subjects is restrained
wherever that restraint be inflicted' (Blackstone, 1768, vol 3, p 131)") and Sir Edward Coke
("'But the other kind of writs that are mandatory and not remedial, are not tied to any place, but
do follow subjection and ligeance in what country or nation soever the subject is...') Id. at
1089-90 (quoting In re Mansergh, Eng. Rep. at 292-93).
91 R v. Lord Chancellor, Exparte Witham, [1985] Q.B. 575 at 575-76 (Eng.).
92 Id. at 581. A latter case, provided the rationale for such a position:
Parliamentary sovereignty means that Parliament can, if it chooses, legislate contrary
to fundamental principles of human rights .... The constraints upon its exercise by
Parliament are ultimately political, not legal. But the principle of legality means that
Parliament must squarely confront what it is doing and accept the political cost.
Fundamental rights cannot be overridden by general or ambiguous words. This is
because there is too great a risk that the full implications of their unqualified meaning
may have passed unnoticed in the democratic process. In the absence of express
language or necessary implication to the contrary, the courts therefore presume that
even the most general words were intended to be subject to the basic rights of the
individual.
R v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, Ex parte Simms, (2000) 2 A.C. 1125 (Eng.). Id. at 131.
93 Liyanage v. The Queen, [1967] I A.C. 259 at 260 (Eng.).
Wisconsin International Law Journal
colony by express words or necessary intendment.94 In Liyanage
appellants had been convicted of grave criminal offences under the laws
of the Parliament of Ceylon, specifically adopted to retrospectively
deprive the appellants of their right to trial by jury. The appellants had
argued that the Parliament of Ceylon could not adopt any legislation
"which is contrary to fundamental principles of justice."'5 The Privy
Council held that it "cannot accept the view that the legislation (Colonial
Laws Validity Act) while removing the fetter of repugnancy to English
law, left in existence a fetter of repugnancy to some vague unspecified
law of natural justice."'96
The choice before the Court was a rather clear one. Before
enunciating its position, it framed the situation as being exceptional.
Now it backtracked from the inclusive posture it had adopted while
asserting jurisdiction over the case. It felt compelled to remind itself that
it was "a municipal court of England and Wales... in this case treading
in the field of colonial law."97 While such intrusion was "justified" it also
warranted a "trade-off."98 It appeared to the Court of "particular
importance" that it "should respect the decisions of the Privy council
upon relevant issues of colonial law."99 After all, "[w]here there is a body
of jurisprudence, possessing high authority, which addresses the legal
relations between the United Kingdom and its colonies, we should,
sitting in this court, treat it as settled and binding."'' 0 This was from a
judge who had no problem going against a highly authoritative body of
jurisprudence while enunciating the -Witham standard. The justification
94 Bancoult, [2001] Q.B. at 1092-93.
9' Liyanage, I A.C. at 283.
96 Id. at 284. The Act was adopted in the face of what the Privy Council said were" considerable
difficulties [that] had been caused by the over-insistence of a Colonial judge in South Australia
that colonial legislative Acts must not be repugnant to English Law." Id. The Privy Council cited
with approval the commentary that:
The essential feature of this measure is that it abolished once and for all the vague
doctrine of repugnancy to the principles of English law as a source of invalidity of
any colonial Act. .. . The boon thus secured was enormous; it was now necessary
only for the colonial legislature to ascertain that there was no Imperial Act applicable
and his field of action and choice of means became unfettered.
Id. at 284 (quoting ARTHUR BERRIEDALE KEITH, THE SOVEREIGNTY OF THE BRITISH
DOMINIONS 45 (1929). Id. (discussing KENNETH WHEARE, THE STATUE OF WESTMINSTER AND
DOMINION STATUS 75-77 (4th ed. 1949)).
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for this capitulation was sought in "the specter of conflicting judicial
opinion," one that had been discounted while asserting jurisdiction over
the case.'' The Court acknowledged the consequence of its holding that
the "constitutional principle" described in Witham could not "withstand
the authority of Liyanage" namely that "as regards fundamental or
constitutional rights, there is a difference of approach between the
developed law of England and the law applicable to the colonies."'' 2 This
consequence, however, issued from a foundational difference in legal
subjecthood: "[b]elongers here take the benefit of the constraints which
the common law imposes upon the construction of legislation which
interferes with such rights; belongers there do not."'0 3 Acknowledging
this was a "misfit," the Court hastened to add that "in practice, in the
post-imperial world as it is, this is a misfit which nearly always will be
nothing but theoretical." This because some colonial territories, like
Gibraltar, "possess written constitutions which enshrine fundamental
rights based on or akin to the model of the European Convention on
Human Rights." But, "BIOT does not, and there is therefore dissonance,
one which may strike real lives, between the richness of the rights which
our municipal law today affords and the wintry asperity of authority such
as Liyanage." This, notwithstanding the recital of the history of BIOT by
the Court earlier in the opinion, would imply that some self-determining
inhabitants of BIOT had chosen not to entrench their fundamental rights.
Much less self-determining, the whole BIOT project, designed in
London, aimed at having no inhabitants. While refuting the
government's position that the BIOT Commissioner may legislate
absolutely as he chooses, Lord Justice Laws stated that this would mean
"[t]he Commissioner would be above the law, save I suppose to the
extent that his masters in London might correct him."" 4 So the
inhabitants of BIOT have to suffer the consequences of not having
entrenched their fundamental rights in a situation where the only
constituent and legislative power is the Commissioner and his masters in
London. Confronted with the miss-fitting dissonance, the Court's task
was seen as being "accordingly acute." The chasm could be bridged,
however, by invoking the foundational fracture in the very notion of the




-04 Id. at 1100.
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between here and there. The Court itself would "affront the rule of law if
we translated the liberal perceptions of today, even if they have become
the warp and weave of our domestic public law, into law binding on
established colonial powers in the face of authority that we should do no
such thing."'' 5 Thus, the Witham principle was found inapplicable.
V. VIRES OF THE ORDINANCE: WANTED DEAD AND ALIVE
Turning to the substantive grounds of the challenge to the
Ordinance, the Court first dealt with the petitioner's claim that the
Ordinance was ultra vires as it violated the rights and liberties enshrined
in Chapter 29 of Magna Carta (1297)."6 This section of Magna Carta
provides that:
[n]o freeman shall be taken or imprisoned, or be disseized of his
freehold, or liberties, or free customs, or be outlawed, or exiled, or
any other wise destroyed; nor will we pass upon him, nor condemn
him, but by lawful judgment of his peers, or by the law of the land.
We will sell to no man, we will not deny or defer to any man either
justice or right.1
0 7
Counsel for Bancoult argued that the Ordinance amounted to the
exiling of the Ilois; thus, being repugnant to Magna Carta, the Ordinance
was void and unlawful. For this argument-one that Lord Justice Laws
described as possessing "beguiling simplicity"'° 8-to succeed, it would
have to be shown that Magna Carta extended to the colony of BLOT. The
answer to the question, the Court opined, lay in Magna Carta overcoming
the exception enshrined in the Colonial Laws Validity Act 1865, that no
colonial law shall be deemed to be void on grounds of repugnancy to the
law of England, unless it is repugnant to an Act of Parliament made
applicable to such colony by express words or necessary implication. 9
The government contested petitioner's position on two grounds. Initially,
it argued that Magna Carta did not constitute a statute at all, or at least
did not do so for the purposes of the 1865 Act. Lord Justice Laws was
"dismayed" to hear the government argue that Magna Carta "belonged to
some unspecified category of subordinate law.""'  Following an
105 Id.
106 Magna Carta, 1297, 25 Edw. 1, c. 29.
107 Magna Carta, (1297), 10 HALS. STAT. (4th ed.) 16.
'08 Bancoult, [2001] Q.B. at 1093.
'09 See Liyanage v. The Queen, [1967] 1 A.C. 259 at 284.
"1o Bancoult, [2001] Q.B. at 1093.
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examination of the Charter's history and its repeated confirmation by
Parliament, the government resiled from this position. The government
further argued that Magna Carta did not extend to BIOT, because BIOT
was a ceded not a settled colony. The appellant argued that BIOT should
be regarded as a settled colony because "by the time [it] was created as a
separate colony [in 1965] it had a settled population.""' Furthermore, the
appellant argued that the Crown's legislative powers in respect of the
colony should not now depend on whether the colony is regarded as
ceded or settled.
The distinction between ceded and settled colonies is an
entrenched principle of colonial law, which some trace back to the early
Stuart period."2 Cession refers to colonies which were ceded to the
Crown by treaty or other agreement. Settlement refers to colonies which
were acquired by virtue of their having been settled by British subjects in
a place where there was "no civilized government and legal system.""3
Traditionally the law-making powers of the Crown are different for the
two categories. The difference is often traced back to the Calvin Case of
1608," which stated that "if a King come to a Christian kingdom by
conquest... he may at his pleasure alter and change the laws of that
kingdom... [b]ut if a King hath a kingdom by title or decent.., he
cannot change those laws himself without the consent of Parliament.""5
This dictum was cited by Lord Mansfield in a leading case of colonial
law, Campbell v. Hall."6 In Campbell, Lord Mansfield ruled that the
Crown will cease to possess full legislative power over even a conquered
or ceded colony once it has granted to such a colony a representative
legislative body without reserving to itself the power to legislate."7 In the
absence of such a representative legislature, the Crown retains sovereign
legislative authority unencumbered by any English law. Hence, it is only
in the case of a settled colony that an English Act (such as Magna Carta)
. Bancoult, [2001] Q.B. at 1071.
112 See Adam Tomkins, Magna Carta, Crown and Colonies, 2001 PUB. L. 571, 577; SIR KENNETH
ROBERTS-WRAY, COMMONWEALTH AND COLONIAL LAW 636 (1966).
"13 ROBERTS-WRAY, supra note 110, at 99.
114 77 Eng. Rep. 377 (K.B. 1608). 7 Co. Rep. Ia. Lord Coke held that upon conquest by a Christian
king, "the laws of the infidel are abrogated, for that they be not only against Christianity, but
against the law of God and of nature False" Id. at 17 b.
I'5 Id. at 17 b.
116 Campbell v. Hall, (1774) 98 Eng. Rep. 1045 (K.B.); I Cowp. 204.
117 This ruling was entrenched by the Privy Council in Abeyesekera v. Jayatilake (1932) A.C. 260 at
264 (Eng.).
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accompanies the Englishmen who settle the new colony, becomes law of
the land, and limits the legislative power of the Crown.
Turning to the interface of Magna Carta and the 1865 Act,
clearly Magna Carta is not applied to any colony by express words. The
question remained whether it could still be so by necessary intendment.
Petitioner urged reliance on Calder v. Attorney General of British
Columbia,"8 in which the Supreme Court of Canada stated that Magna
Carta "has always been considered to be the law throughout the Empire.
It was a law which followed the flag as England assumed jurisdiction
over newly discovered or acquired lands or territories.""' 9 In making this
statement, the Canadian court disregarded any distinction between ceded
and settled colonies. The statement was later approved by Lord Denning
MR in R. v. Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Ex
p. Indian Association of Alberta.2' Lord Justice Laws found the
arguments as regards to Magna Carta "in the end, barren."'' He ruled
that even if Magna Carta 'followed the flag' to BIOT, its potency would
not suffice to condemn what has been done here, if it was done in
accordance with the law, not merely the letter of the law, but in
accordance with our substantive constitutional law."' 2  He opined that
Magna Carta "is in truth the first general declaration.., in the long run
of our constitutional jurisprudence, of the principle of the rule of law."'23
Is Calder v. A-G of B.C., [1973] 34 D.L.R. 45, 203 (Can.).
119 Id.
120 R v. Sec'y of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Ex parte Indian Association of
Alberta, [1982] Q.B. 892 at 912. The government sought instead reliance on the decision of the
Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in in Staples v. The Queen (unreported) (Jan. 27, 1899).
Bancoult, [2001] Q.B. at 1093. This is an unreported case, but the Judicial Committee issued a
memorandum of their decision. Id. The case concerned Matabeleland, a protectorate not a
colony, the question was whether denial of trial by jury was unlawful due to conflict with Magna
Carta. id. at 1093-94. The Privy Council held that Magna Carta did not extend to a protectorate,
to which section 12 of the Foreign Jurisdiction Act 1890 applied. Id. at 1094. Section 12 of that
Act is substantially the same as Section 2 and 3 of the 1865 Act. Id The memorandum stated that
the repugnancy contemplated by the Foreign Jurisdiction Act must mean repugnancy to a statute
or order applied in some special way to British subjects in the foreign country in question. Id. "It
would be a most unreasonable limit on the Crown's power of introducing laws fitting to the
circumstances of its subjects in a foreign country if it were made impossible to modify any Act
of Parliament which prior to the Order in Council might be invoked as applicable to a British
subject." Id. (quoting a memorandum to the Privy Council). Petitioner argued that Staples
addresses issues of a protectorate, not a colony like BIOT. Because citizens of a colony are
Queen's subjects, they enjoy the legal heritage of Magna Carta.
.21 Bancoult, [2001] Q.B. at 1094.
122 id.
123 Id. at 1095 (quoting 1 FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF
ENGLISH LAW 173 (2d ed. 1923)).
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If he had any doubts otherwise about the reach of Magna Carta, for Lord
Justice Laws "[s]o far as it is a proclamation of the rule of law, it may
indeed be said to follow the flag-certainly as far as BIOT."' '24 Still, it
"does not provide the answer,"'25 because Magna Carta, in the Court's
view, "does not... curtail the sovereignty of the proper lawmaker to
make what laws seem fit to him."'2 6 Magna Carta is not an absolute ban
on exile; it merely states that no freeman "shall be exiled ... but ... by
the law of the land."'27 Lord Justice Laws rejected petitioner's claim that
the law of the land, in the context of Magna Carta, only includes an Act
of Parliament or an established rule of common law.'28 He took the
position that an "Order in Council may in the context of the Crown's
powers to make law for a colony amount to an act of primary legislation
under the prerogative."'29 The question for Lord Justice Laws remained
whether the Ordinance was within the scope of the form and substance of
legal authority. As discussed infra, Lord Justice Laws did rule the
Ordinance as void on account of being beyond the scope of its enabling
legislation. It is curious then why Magna Carta's limitation of "the law of
the land" would not render the Ordinance void. The implicit project
appears to be retention of the colonial exception, lest Magna Carta is
used to put colonial subjects on the same footing as English colonizers.
The question of whether BIOT was a ceded or a settled colony
was determinative of the question whether the power to legislate for
BIOT arose ultimately from the Queen's prerogative, or the British
Settlements Act 1887.30 While the Crown enjoys prerogative power to
make laws for a ceded colony,'3 ' in relation to a settled colony legislative
power is conferred on the Queen in Council by statute, the British
Settlements Act 1887, and the prerogative gives no legislative authority
in such a case.'32 The 1887 Act defines "British settlement":
124 Id. at 1095.
125 id.
126 Id. at 1094.
127 id.
128 Petitioner had cited the authority of Entick v. Carrington for the proposition that save in time of
war, the executive has no power to abridge the freedoms of the Queen's subjects save by
authority of a valid statute or an established common law prerogative. Id. at 1095 (citing Entick
v. Carrington, (1765) 95 Eng. Rep. 275 (K.B.) 292; 2 Wils. 807).
129 Bancoult, [2001] Q.B. at 1095.
130 British Settlements Act, 1887, 50 & 5! Vict. c. 54.
3 1 Abeyesekera v. Jayatilake (1932) A.C. 260 at 264.
132 Sammut v. Strickland (1938) A.C. 678 at 701.
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[a]ny British possession which has not been acquired by cession or
conquest, and is not for the time being within the jurisdiction of the
Legislature, constituted otherwise than by virtue of this Act or any
Act repealed by this Act, of any British possession.'
33
Section 2 of the 1887 Act provides, in part,
[i]t shall be lawful for Her Majesty the Queen in Council from time
to time to establish all such laws and institutions.., as may appear to
Her Majesty in Council to be necessary for the peace, order, and good
government of Her Majesty's subjects and others within any British
settlement.
Lord Justice Laws ruled that the ceded or settled question "has
surely to be determined as at the time when the territory concerned
became subject to the Queen's dominion."'34 While accepting petitioner's
submission that in 1965, when BIOT was established as a separate
colony, it had a settled population of citizens of the United Kingdom and
its colonies, he noted that it was "beyond question that BOT was in
1814 part of a ceded colony."'35 Consequently, he held that "the 1887 Act
has no application to this case.'' 36 The implication is that as a matter of
royal prerogative, the Crown could make whatever laws it deemed fit for
BIOT, including exiling the whole population, without regard to Magna
Carta or any other constitutional provision or convention. Judge Gibbs,
while admitting that the distinction between ceded and settled was
"admittedly in modem context, [an] arcane distinction," concurred with
Lord Justice Laws that BIOT was a ceded colony and thus Magna Carta
offered no help to the applicant.'37 The language used by Judge Gibbs is
worth noting. He said "[i]f Magna Carta had applied to people such as
the applicant, I might have found assistance in the provisions of Chapter
133 British Settlements Act, supra note 128, § 6.
134 Bancoult, [2001] Q.B. at 1102.
135 Id.
136 Id. A settled colony is one acquired by the Crown by virtue of it having been settled by British
subjects in a place where there was no "civilized government and legal system." Tomkins, supra
note 110, at 577. The Court did not explore whether there was any "civilized government or legal
system," or even an indigenous population, in the Chagos Islands in 1814. Id. at 579 n.39. The
government's position in the 1960s and 1970s was there was no permanent indigenous
population on the islands even in 1971. Id. The four methods of acquisition of a colony,
settlement, cession, annexation, and conquest are not necessarily mutually exclusive. Id. at 577.
The islands did indeed fall under the sovereignty of the Crown by virtue of having been ceded by
France in 1814, but given its later history and demographic changes, the Court could have
declared it to be both a ceded and settled colony, thereby removing the dissonance in its ruling
regarding the application of Magna Carta. Id. at 579 n.39.
7 Bancoult, [2001] Q.B. at 1107.
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29 in interpreting the legality of the Ordinance, at least in the resolution
of any doubts on the point."'38 Universality of law, therefore, yields to
differential status and eligibility to protections, with the divide between
colonizers and the colonized furnishing the bright line.
There is a remarkable dissonance in the ruling. On the one hand,
both judges ruled that Magna Carta was not applicable due to BIOT's
status as a ceded colony. On the other, Lord Justice Laws stated that
Magna Carta, in so far as it is a proclamation of the rule of law, did
indeed follow the flag "certainly as far as BIOT. ' "39 The Court's reliance
on the arcane distinction has the effect that a foundational fracture of the
imperial heritage continues: constitutional and fundamental rights of
Englishmen are not extended to the remaining colonies.4°
The Court, of course, remained wary of "entry into a barbarous
world where there is no rule of law."'' This specter was raised by the
government's submission that the BIOT Commissioner may legislate
absolutely as he chooses. The Court took the position that powers of any
colonial legislature were limited by the Act that created it. 41 "[N]othing
I ld. at 1106. The leading authority on the efficacy of Magna Carta within Britain is the decision
of the Court of Appeal in R v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, Ex parte Phansopkar
[1976] Q.B. 606. Phansopkar concerned the rule of against delay contained in chapter 29. Id. at
626. The delay arose in the granting of a certificate of partiality under terms of the Immigration
Act 1971. Id. at 606. Magna Carta was cited by all three judges in obiter dicta. Id at 621, 624,
626. M/R. explained that the Immigration Act 1971 provided that wives of partials could enter
the United Kingdom by right, rather than by leave, and as such enjoyed an entitlement, and not a
mere privilege. Id. at 608. "Such being her right," he continued, "I do not think it can be taken
away by arbitrarily refusing her a certificate or by delaying to issue it to her without good cause."
Id. at 621. He then added that in such an event, the woman concerned could "invoke" Magna
Carta. Id. Lawton L.J. agreed, stating that the Secretary of State "cannot refuse to consider the
application, nor can he delay consideration unreasonably. Id at 624. Lawton L.J. agreed, stating
that the Secretary of State "cannot refuse to consider the application, nor can he delay
consideration unreasonably. These duties were imposed on the Crown and its servants by Magna
Carta." Id. at 624. Scarman L.J. spoke in similar terms. 1d. at 626.
139 Bancoult, [2001] Q.B. at 1095.
140 Britain's remaining colonies are: Anguilla, Bermuda, the British Virgin Islands, the Cayman
Islands, the Falkland Islands, Gibraltar, Montserrat, the Pitcaim Islands, St. Helena (with sub-
dependencies Tristan da Cunha and Ascension Island), and the Turks and Caicos Islands. Britain
also controls three colonies with no permanent indigenous population: The British Antarctic
Territory, the BLOT, and South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands. See FOREIGN AFFAIRS
SELECT COMMITTEE, DEPENDENT TERRITORIES REVIEW: INTERIM REPORT, 1997-98, H.C. 347;
SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH AFFAIRS, WHITE PAPER ON THE
OVERSEAS TERRITORIES: PARTNERSHIP FOR PROGRESS AND PROSPERITY, 1999, Cm. 4264; Id
at9-11.
141 Bancoult, [2001] Q.B. at 1100.
142 The Court relied on the authority of Privy Council's pronouncement that:
The Indian legislature has powers expressly limited by the Act of the Imperial
Parliament which created it, and it can, of course, do nothing beyond the limits which
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could be more elementary" than that "a legislature created by a measure
passed by a body which is legally prior to it must act within the confines
of the power thereby conferred."'43 Furthermore, the government ook the
position that in light of the Colonial Laws Validity Act, the
Commissioner's legislative powers could not be challenged on any
ground, save that it conflicted with a British stature which extended to
BIOT. The Court took the position that prior to the issue of such conflict
is the principle that a legislative body in the colonies can only legislate
on matters within its competence and limits of its jurisdiction.'"
Consequently, the case would turn on the question of whether the Order
of removal and exile was within the scope of the Commissioner's
legislative powers as enumerated by the BIOT Order.
The BIOT Order was made on November 8, 1965 by "Her
Majesty, by virtue and in exercise of powers in that behalf by the
Colonial Boundaries Act 1895, or otherwise in Her Majesty vested."'45
The Court noted that the 1895 Act merely regulates the alteration of a
colonial boundary, and hence "affords no source of the vires of the BIOT
Order for the presently relevant purposes.'4 6 The BIOT Order, the Court
opined, "is an Order in Council made under the powers of the royal
prerogative."'47 Given the Court's holding that BIOT was a ceded colony,
the Order implied that there was no limit to the exercise of the royal
prerogative, and that the Commissioner of BIOT created by the Order
could have been given unbridled legislative powers if the Crown had so
chosen.4 The Court noted that the Order provided that "[t]he
circumscribe these powers. But when acting within those limits, it is not in any sense
an agent or delegate of the Imperial Parliament, but has, and was intended to have,
plenary powers of legislation, as large, and of the same nature, as those of Parliament
itself.
Bancoult, [2001] Q.B. at 1100 (citing R v. Burah (1878), 3 App. Cas. 889 at 904.).
143 id.
144 Besides Burah, authority for this postulate was identified as the Court of Exchequer Chamber in
Phillips v. Eyre (1870) LR 6 QB 1, 20:
We are satisfied that it is sound law, and that a confirmed act of the local legislature
lawfully constituted, whether in a settled or conquered colony, has, as to matters
within its competence and the limits of its jurisdiction, the operation and force of
sovereign legislature, though subject to be controlled by the imperial parliament.
Id. at 1101 (quoting Phillips v. Eyre, (1870) Q.B. I at 20).
145 Id. at 1076; Tomkins supra note 110 at 571 n. 3 (citing 1965, S.l. 1965/ revoked and replaced by
the British Indian Ocean Territory Order, 1976, S.I. 1976/893).
146 Id. at 1076.
147 id.
148 The Court said, "[h]owever broad the power in point of theory to legislate for a colony such as
BlOT, here it has been done by a particular means." Id. at 1101.
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Commissioner shall have such powers and duties as are conferred or
imposed upon him by or under this Order."'49 Furthermore, Section 11 of
the BOT Order, which the Court found to be of "critical importance to
the central arguments in the case,"'5° provides that "[t]he Commissioner
may make laws for peace, order, and good government of the
Territory."'' The scope of the Order would determine the vires of the
Ordinance because the Ordinance, including Section 4 that mandated
removal and exile of the inhabitants, had been made in exercise of
powers conferred by the Order. In the evocative expression of Lord
Justice Laws, "[i]f the chosen last is Section 11, the boot of Section 4 can
be no bigger."'52
The government took the position that the formula of "peace,
order, and good government," used so often in measures conferring
powers to make colonial law, was to be taken as having the widest
possible intendment.'53 The Court generally agreed with this contention
and as authorities for the proposition, cited Jbralehbo v. The Queen,'54
Winfat Enterprise (HK) Co Ltd. V. Attorney General for Hong King,
55
and R. v. Earl of Crewe, Ex parte Sekgome.'56 Consequently, the Court
149 Id. at 1076 (quoting BIOT Order, s. 5).
"o Id. at 1076.
I5' ld. at 1077 (quoting BlOT Order, s. I1).
152 Id. at 1101.
153 The authority for proposition was Riel v. The Queen, (1885) 10 App. Cas. 675 The case
concerned an Act of the Imperial Parliament authorizing the Canadian Parliament to make laws
"for the administration, peace, order, and good government of any territory." The Privy Council
held that:
It appears to be suggested that any provisions differing from the provisions which in
this country have been made for administration, peace, order, and good government
cannot, as a matter of law, be provisions for peace, order, and good government in the
territories to which the statute relates, and further that, if a court of law should come
to the conclusion that a particular enactment was not calculated as a matter of fact and
policy to secure peace, order, and good government, that they would be entitled to
regard any statute directed to these objects, but which a court should think likely to
fail to that effect, as ultra vires and beyond the competency of the Dominion
Parliament to enact. Their Lordships are of the opinion that there is not the least
colour for such a contention. The words of the statute are apt to authorize the utmost
discretion of enactment for the attainment of the objects pointed to.
Id. at 678.
'l' Ibralehbo v. The Queen, (1964) A.C. 900 at 924 held that the words peace, order and good
government "connote, in British constitutional language, the widest law-making powers
appropriate to a sovereign."
Winfat Enterprise Co. Ltd. V. A-G for H.K., (1985) A.C. 733 at 747 held that in makes no
difference to the legislative power's breadth that the colonial legislature in question is not
established on representative principles.
156 R v. Earl of Crewe, Ex parte Sekgome, (1920) 2 K.B. 576 at 613.
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found it to be "beyond the possibility of argument" that a colonial
legislature empowered to make laws for the peace, order, and good
government of its territory, "is the sole judge of what those
considerations factually require. It is not obliged to respect precepts of
the common law, or English traditions of fair treatment."'57 Still, the
Court found that colonial legislative authority "is not wholly
unrestrained. Peace, order and good government may be a very large
tapestry, but every tapestry has a border."'5 8  The Court also
acknowledged that "a very wide margin of discretion is to be accorded to
the decision-maker."'59 The Court noted that "in stark contrast our
modem domestic law tends in favor of a narrower margin, and a more
intrusive judicial review, wherever fundamental or constitutional rights
are involved."'60  This differential treatment simply "recalls the
dissonance.., between the rights which the common law confers here,
and the thinner rule of law which the jurisprudence has accorded the
colonies."''
The Court noted that Section 4 of the Ordinance "effectively
exiles the Ilois from the territory where they are belongers and forbids
their return."'62 Whereas, peace, order, and good government of any
territory "means nothing, surely, save by reference to the territory's
population. They are to be governed not removed."'63 In the colonies,
colonial subjects may rightfully be governed as colonial authorities
please with law that "may be far different from what obtains in
England."'' " But the colonial subjects are subjects of the Crown, "who
'" Bancoult, [2001] Q.B. at 1103.
IS Id. The Court cited Trustees Executor & Agency Co. Ltd v. Federal Court of Taxation, (1933)
49 C.L.R. 220, where the High Court of Australia started:
The correct general principle is ... whether the law in question can be truly described
as being for the peace, order and good government of the Dominion concerned...
The judgment of Lord Macmillan [in Croft v. Dunphy, (1933) AC 156] affirms the
broad principle that the powers possessed are to be treated as analogous to those of 'a
fully sovereign state', so long as they answer the description of laws for the peace,
order, and good government of the constitutional unit in question ...
Id. at 1103 (quoting Trs. Ex'r & Agency Co. Ltd., 49 C.L.R. 220 at 234-5).
'l ld. at 1104 (citing Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v. Wednesbury Corp., (1948) 1
K.B. 223 at 228).
160 id.
161 Id. (emphasis added).
162 id.
163 The wholesale removal of a people from the land where they belong could be for the peace, order
and good government only in extraordinary instances like some natural or man-made catastrophe
that renders the land toxic and uninhabitable. Id.
'6' These could include trials withoutjuries and "severe, even brutal penalties." Id.
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rightly look ... to the rule of law which is given in the Queen's name,
for the security of their homeland within the Queen's dominions."'65 The
Ilois had been exiled for "high political reasons: good reasons, certainly,
dictated by pressing considerations of military security."'66 Where tested
by intrusive approach of judicial review of decision-maker's discretion in
domestic law or the deferential approach of colonial law, "they are not
reasons which may reasonably be said to touch the peace, order and good
government of BIOT."' 67 The fact that the Ilois owned no real estate on
the islands, or any monetary compensation for the removal and exile
"cannot affect the position in public or constitutional law."'68 Hence, the
Court held, "the apparatus of Section 4 of the Ordinance has no color of
lawful authority."'69 For good measure, Lord Justice Laws then quoted
Tacitus ("They make a desert and call it peace.") and added, "He meant
it as an irony, but here, it was an abject legal failure."'70 Lord Justice
Laws proceeded to muse whether the removal and exile could have been
achieved by royal prerogative or by an Act of Parliament. He had
"considerable doubt whether the prerogative power extends so far as to
permit the Queen in Council to exile her subjects from the territory
where they belong."'' He found "unexplored ground here," but "would
certainly hold this.., could only be done by statute."'72 The bottom line
then: the colonized cannot be exiled but they can be governed as the
colonizer pleases; the colonized is wanted, both dead and alive.
VI. CONCLUSION
When asked to explore borders and border disputes in the
context of modem international law, postcolonials, those who exist "after
165 Id. at 1104 (citing JOSEPH CHITrY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF THE PREROGATIVES OF THE
CROWN AND THE RELATIVE DUTIES AND RIGHTS OF THE SUBJECT (1820)).
166 Bancoult, [2001] Q.B. at 1104.
167 id.
168 Id. at 1105.
169 id.
170 id.
'71 Id. (citing I BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 137 (1809); CHITTY,
supra note 163, at 21; PLENDER, INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION LAW 133 (2d ed. 1988)). Plender
observed that "A significant number of modem national constitutions characterize the right to
enter one's own country as a fundamental or human right." PLENDER, INTERNATIONAL
MIGRATION LAW 135 (2d ed. 1988).
172 Bancoult, [2001] Q.B. at 1105.
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being worked over by colonialism,"'73 cannot but remain mindful of
formative and enduring entanglement of modem international law with
the colonial encounter between the West and the Rest. This is
particularly true given Empire's coming out of the closet as the inaugural
gesture of the twenty-first century. We are told that today "the need for
colonization is as great as it ever was in the nineteenth century .... What
is needed then is a new kind of imperialism, one acceptable to a world of
human rights and cosmopolitan values."'74 An unavoidable task then is to
examine how modem borders are drawn and redrawn and the extent to
which the grammar of colonialism may be implicated in the global reach
of international law, constitutionalism, and human rights.
This article has explored whether the ubiquitous
exclusion/inclusion binary is a helpful frame to measure the depth and
reach of constitutionalism and human rights. A close reading of Bancoult
shows that inscription of the law over subjugated bodies and spaces
continues to subscribe to an enduring grammar of modernity's
engagement with alterity. This grammar is not one of exclusion, but,
rather forms a three-pronged matrix engagement:
engulfment/exception/subordination. The Other is not "discovered," left
out or left alone-excluded from operations of constitutional regimes,
and then gradually incorporated as rights-bearing subject. The Other is
always already engulfed in operations of modern law, placed in zones of
exception, and positioned in states of subordination. Constitutional law
and human rights presume the presence of human beings. Explorations of
constitutionalism and human rights must contend with the enduring
existence of "unpeople"-"beings who impede the pursuit of high policy
and whose rights, often lives, therefore become irrelevant."'
' 75
173 Gyan Prakash, Posicolonial Criticism and Indian Historiography, Soc. TEXT, no. 31/32, 1992, at
8.
'74 Robert Cooper, The New Liberal Imperialism, THE GUARDIAN (Apr. 7, 2002),
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2002/apr/07/I. Cooper, a high ranking British diplomat and
subsequently a special advisor to the EU's Foreign Affairs Chief, was widely recognized as
British Labor Prime Minister Tony Blair's "guru" in foreign affairs.
'75 MARK CURTIS, THE AMBIGUITIES OF POWER: BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY SINCE 1945 116 (1995).
